Late in October 1796, the Austrians were completing arrangements for their third counter-offensive. A new commander, General Baron Josef Alvintzi, was given the task of relieving his predecessor (Wurmser) in Mantua and recapturing northern Italy. Some 60,000 soldiers were assembled, giving the Austrians a numerical superiority of about 20,000 over the Army of Italy, which now included 3,000 men of "la légion lombarde".
At the beginning of November Alvintzi crossed the Piave with two columns under Quasdanovich and Provera, while Davidovich menaced Vaubois' division in the Adige Valley, north of Lake Garda. Following his proven formula, Bonaparte decided to deal with Davidovich as a preliminary to concentrating against the main Austrian force. Bonaparte sent Berthier to Vaubois with instructions to attack, while Masséna withdrew before Alvintzi. On this occasion the plan produced contridictory results; Vaubois was badly beaten on 6 November; but simultaneously, at Bonaparte's direction, Masséna seized an opportunity to inflict a reverse on Alvintzi's vanguard.
Bonaparte's anger at this initial defeat blazed forth in an open condemnation of Vaubois' division;
"Soldiers, I am not satisfied with you; you have shown neither discipline, nor perseverance, nor bravery; no position could rally you; you abandoned yourselves to panic; you let yourselves be driven from positions where a handful of brave men might have stopped an army. Soldiers of the 39th and 85th [demi-brigades], you are not French soldiers."
Then, turning to the chef d'etat-major, he said: "Let their colors be inscribed:'They no longer form part of the Army of Italy'."
(Correspondance de Napoleon Ier, II 131 (No. 1170))
The Army of Italy was forced back to Verona, but still stood between the Austrians and Mantua. Bonaparte was in a very difficult position. If Davidovich had maintaied the momentum of his souther advance, after defeating Vaubois, and had effected a junction with the remainder of Alvintzi's army, the French situation would have been desperate. In all probability Mantua would have been relieved and Bonaparte would have faced a combined force of overwhelming strength.
On 10 November Alvintzi learned of Davidovich's successes and decided to test the French defences around Verona in hopes of linking up with Davidovich at the same time. On 11 November he reached Villnuova (10 miles east of Verona) and sent out a strong advance guard to the high ground running from Caldiero north through Colognolo. From the Caldiero area, the vedettes of the Austrian advance guard pushed forward to within two miles of Verona at San Michele.
Bonaparte saw the opportunity to destroy Alvintzi's advance guard in its forward position and to build
much needed morale. The French moved out on the evening of 11 November, drove in the enemy outposts,
and camped east of San Marco, some 3 miles east of Verona. Bonaparte's attack was launched early
on 12 November with Augereau advancing south of the highway agaist Caldiero. Masséna advanced to the
north to attack Colognolo and the adjacent high ground.
On 13 November, Bonaparte adopted a bold plan to regain the initiative. He quickly crossed the Adige at Ronco (15 miles south-east of Verona) on 15 November, and took up a defensive position, threatening the Austrian rear comminications to Vicenza. The topography of the area, in particular the Arcole marshes, favored the defence. Thus Alvintzi was compelled to attack without being able to deploy his full strength. The ensuing Battle of Arcole lasted three days, beginning on 15 November, and was stubbornly contested by both sides.
Ultimately, Alvintzi was driven back and Davidovich prudently withdrew into the Tyrol. The total Austrian losses were about one-third of the 20,000 engaged; French casualties were approximately the same owing to earlier reverses.
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At the end of the first week in 1797 the Austrians launched a final offensive with 47,000 men. Their strategic aim was to relieve Mantua and effect a junction with the Papal forces. (A dispatch outlining the enemy's plans fell into Bonaparte's hands before the operations began.) Again Alvintzi moved south on two axes; but this time he shifted his weight to the western flank: the main body under his personal command, descended the Adige Valley from Trento, while the remainder, under Provera, crossed the Venetian plain from the east. Whichever way Bonaparte moved, the Austrians counted upon raising the seige of Mantua. Experience had not taught them the danger of focusing on that city.
With an army reinforced to a strength of 37,000 (exclusive of 8,500 beseiging Mantua), Bonaparte waited until he was certain of the direction of the main Austrian effort. By the afternoon of 13 January, he knew that the principal threat would be made in the Adige Valley. As on previous occasions, his primary concern was to attack Alvintzi before the latter could concentrate. Precise instructions were dispatched to Masséna and Rey, setting them on the road to join Joubert at Rivoli on the Adige, about 15 miles north of Verona, while Serurier was warned to guard against any attempt by Wurmser to break out of Mantua. Bonaparte selected a strong defensive position on a plateau at Rivoli as the scene of the battle.
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