One of the best examples of the French attacking in an extended line formation occurred at the Combat of Maida (4 July 1806) where a French force under General Reynier encountered a small British expeditionary force led by Major-General John Stuart near Calabria, Italy. The French forces consisted of the 1st and 23rd regiments légère, a battalion of the 42nd de ligne, the 1st Swiss Regiment, the 1st Polish Regiment and a squadron from the 9th Regiment of chasseurs à cheval. There were also four cannons from the 1st Regiment of light artillery for a total of about four thousand men.
During the night of the 3rd, the French reconnoitered the various roads in the surrounding area to determine which would most readily allow the artillery to move towards the British camp, General Reynier, commanding the French force, advised his men that they would attack the British at daybreak, and that this assault was to be conducted without musket fire, and resolved solely with the bayonet. The French troops appeared to be enthusiastic and eagerly awaited the opportunity to come to grips with the British force. Unfortunately, the French plans had to be delayed. It was necessary to wait until the arrival of the 42nd de ligne, which was on its way from Reggio. It only arrived at six o'clock in the morning. Meanwhile, as French forces idled the British worked their way inland. General Reynier finally gave the order for his troops to ready themselves for the attack. His instructions were to form in battle on the regiment furthest to the right as soon as it had crossed the Amato. In response the French regiments left a defensible position, crossed the Amato, and began to manoeuvre to form a line in the plain.
At about this time the British army neared and formed its line by what the commander of the French artillery looking on described as 'a simple half turn to the left'. This tells us that the British had traversed their intended line of battle, moving from left to right, and once the British army had positioned itself along the battle position in an open order column (right in front), they formed line by quarter-wheeling each of the platoons or divisions in the column. Line would have formed in moments, with each platoon in battalion in its normal order. The British did not hesitate. Immediately after line was formed, the order to attack on the double was issued in an attempt to attack the French as the latter manoeuvred to place its regiments into line.
The French regiments meanwhile scrambled to place themselves in line. The three battalions in the 1st légère were originally on the right side of the French forces but crossed over to the left flank in front of the other regiments. As a consequence, it ended up in front of the other regiments. To its right and slightly to the rear came the 1st Polish Regiment followed by the French artillery. The 1st Swiss and the 23rd regiment légère were still further back on the French right. The squadron of the 9th chasseurs a cheval on the French right moved further outward presumably to make way for the infantry behind it. As often happened, the horses threw up a considerable amount of dust, temporarily obscuring the main French force from British view. However, as the dust settled, the French were seen to be advancing.
General Compère, who commanded the brigade on the French left flank, rigorously started to apply General Reynier's orders without taking into account all of the events that were beginning to unfold. Seeing the advancing British line, Compère was anxious to deliver a stroke before the British could close, There was no time to wait for the French line to be fully formed, and the order to advance with lowered bayonets at the pas de charge was given. When offering an opinion of Compère's actions many years later, the officer commanding the French artillery argued that the French infantry, facing an enemy themselves hell-bent on closing, should have delivered a well-levelled volley before setting off. What followed was an inadvertent French advance in echelons, with each of the regiments to the right of the 1st légère attempting to catch up. As fate would have it, the British encountered a similar problem so that their right, made of a composite brigade of 800 light infantry, was also slightly in front of the others. This meant that both forces on the side of the field were advanced, while those on the other side were mutually refused.
At Maida, both sides can claim to have been on the offensive. The two armies neared each other in what to the participants appeared to be a matter of moments. Although Reynier had been empathic in his instructions to deliver the assault a prest, that is, without firing, Dyneley has commented on the highly inaccurate, and thus ineffective, French fire experienced in the final moments of the attack. The roots of this inaccurate fire certainly cannot be attributed to any disorder in the advancing ranks. According to Dyneley, who was positioned with his artillery about ten yards in front of the light infantry, the French advance was conducted in the 'finest order it is possible to conceive'. To describe what happened next is probably best left to Dyneley's own words:
We halted, formed into line to oppose them, and then advanced. It would be impossible to describe with what steadiness we came on. I was at this time on the right and about 10 yards in front of the light infantry. The French advanced firmly towards us, keeping up a tremendous fire of musketry which either fell short or over our heads. When we were about 100 yards apart, Col. Kempt, who commanded the light infantry, with incredible coolness gave the order 'Halt!' 'Throw down your blankets, shoes,' etc.; then the order 'Forward!' and in a few seconds after 'Charge!' Our men reserved their fire until within a few yards of the enemy and then fired into their faces. The French turned tail and those who could run fast enough escaped the bayonet, the whole of the rest were either killed, wounded or taken prisoners; in short, Bonaparte's first regiment of infantry was cut to pieces.
From two other eyewitnesses we learn of several other details. The British light infantry apparently delivered but two volleys. These however, proved to be murderous and were sufficient to drive back the French infantry which until then eagerly sought to come to grips with their British counterpart. The first discharge left half the men and 27 officers hors de combat. Despite these losses, the 1st légère managed to regroup. It was at this moment that the 1st Polish Regiment pulled up to the leading French elements and joined the front line just as it set of once again at the pas de charge. The French experienced a second volley which seemed to destroy the right half of the French line. The determination of the French to reach and overthrow the British infantry was such that French had continued their advance almost to the very last moment before contact. This can be deduced from the nature of many of the French casualties that were suffered at this point. James FitzGibbon noted that the French though they finally turned and ran, had waited too long before doing so. The British were sufficiently close that they were able to bayonet more than 300 of the French before the latter were able to build up speed as they ran. It must be borne in mind that in a pursuit, after the first one or two seconds, the fleeing force, no longer encumbered by their weapons, is able to move more quickly than the pursuer.
The day after the battle Lieutenant Sandham visited the sick bay of the ship to which he had been assigned. He described his observations many years later in a conversation with Captain Dyneley who himself had been present at the affair as an officer with the British artillery:
It was curious to see the wounded in the 'sick bay' the following morning - all the French on their faces, being stabbed in the back; while all the British lay on their backs being shot in front by the volley which the French fired as they advanced to charge.
Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the British infantry fire was one of the decisive factors in determining the victor of this contest. Although the French managed to get off at least one volley, it proved to be ragged and ineffective.
