The initial strategy of the United States was relatively simple: land forces would invade Canada, while naval forces, supported by privateers, would take to the seas in search of the British navy and commercial shipping. The most obvious point of attack in Canada was Montreal, but it was felt by some officers that an attack on Canada mounted from the Great Lakes region would offer a greater chance of success and would draw upon the support of a more sympathetic civilian population.
The plan that was eventually accepted was a three-pronged attack against the British positions in Canada. One force would march from Detroit to attack Ontario; another force would move against the British on the Naiagara frontier; a third woul move against Montreal. If executed properly, this attack would have stretched the limited resources of the British forces in Canada to the breaking point, since they woul have been unable to meet any of the advancing columns with a force adequate to stop them. However, the movements of the American forces would have to be closely coordinated so that the British would not have the opportunity to concentrate and defeat the American attacked one at a time.
On the Niagara front, Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer, a member of a prominent New York family and commander of the state militia, was the senior commander of the American force when the campaign opened in the fall of 1812. Although he possessed little active military experience, Van Rensselaer had formulated an ambitious plan to push across the Niagara River and attack the British position at Queenston, Ontario. From this position, he hoped to able to drive the British forces out of the peninsula.
The American troops were concentrated in three camps: at Lewiston, Van Rensselaer had approximately 2,500 militia and 900 regulars; at Fort Niagara were another 1,300 regulars; and at Buffalo, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, the regular army commander in the area, had 1,650 regulars and almost 400 militiamen. Unfortunately, a personal dispute arose between the two commanders. Smyth had proposed a different plan of attack, and when it was rejected by Van Rensselaer, Smyth refused to offer his full cooperation during the operation.
