"Soldiers, you are naked and ill fed; I will lead you into the most fruitful plains in the world. Rich provinces, great cities, will be in your power ..."
(Correspondance de Napoleon Ier, I 118 (No. 91))
Few changes of military command have had greater significance than that which occured at Nice on 27 March 1796. Yet, when they first faced their new commander, the officers of the Army of Italy were unimpressed. Before them stood a young man of only twenty-six years, short of stature, proudly exhibiting a portrait of his bride. Little was known of his background, except that he was a Corsican, and his promotion was attributed to Parisian intrigue.
Bonaparte's immediate problems were formidable. The Austrian and Piedmontese forces, if combined were superior in numbers to the French. Deducting casualties, deserters, and troops in ststic installations, Bonaparte had only 37,600 effectives to oppose 56,000. More significant than numbers, were the low morale and poor equipmemt of the French Army and the great strength of the enemy's dispositions.
Opposite the Army of Italy, 25,000 Piedmontese under General Colli held a huge arc extending from the Col de l'Argentière, some 50 miles north of Nice, to the junction with the Austrians near Carcare, only 10 miles from the coast. Over this long line of mountains Colli positioned his forces to defend the four main passes on his front (the Col de l'Argentière, Col de Tende, Ormea, and Cadibona) and to block the northern exit from the Tanaro Valley. His dispositions were soundly based to allow quick concentrations at Ceva or Coni, towns covering the main approaches to the capital at Turin.
On the left of the Piedmontese, the Austrian Army in Italy, commanded by Beaulieu. Its doctrines were still based on manuevers of earlier decades and during the opening phase of the ensuing campaign, Beaulieu was never able to make effective use of all his forces against the rapid thrusts of Bonaparte.
Meanwhile, Bonaparte was planning the opening phase of the campaign. If he could drive a wedge between the Austrians and Piedmontese and exploit the weaknesses of their alliance. The best opportunity existed on his right flank, opposite the junction of the opposing armies, between Carcare and Ceva. By the end of March the Austrians were pushing southward towards Voltri and Savona believing that the French had intentions of taking Genoa and using its resources for the continuance of the war in Italy. Beaulieu was now too far removed from the key junction at Carcare to intervene, while the French had just enough time to smash the allied pivot before he could recover.
On the afternoon of April 11th, Bonaparte issued orders for the first phase of the offensive. General La Harpe was to leave a small forces north of Savona and on the coastal road east of the port, containing the Austrians in these sectors, while assembling the remainder of his division for an assault on the Montenotte feature, overlooking the road to Dego. This attack would be coordinated with a thrust by a brigade under Masséna's direct command against the enemy rear. Meanwhile, Bonaparte's main force (consisting of Augereau's division and the brigades of Joubert and Dommartin) would advance some miles over a mountain track, leading through Altare, to seize Carcare and seperate the allied armies.
On 13 April 1976, in an effort to dislodge the Austrians from their entrenchments at Millesimo the divisions of Generals Augereau, Masséna, and La Harpe attacked the Austrians, driving them back, and curring Colli's line of communication with General Baron de Beaulieu. Piedmontese losses totalled 6,00 men and 30 guns.
On 14 April, Bonaparte attacked the Allied garrison at Dego and drove the defenders out. General Andre Masséna, however, left the town weakly guarded and on 15 April the Austrians retook it. Later that day, Bonaparte attacked once more and drove the enemy out of Dego to the north. The Allies retreated, Beaulieu to the north and the Piedmontese towards Turin, their capital, which they sought to protect. Bonaparte followed the latter, under Colli.
Full After Action Report shown below as activated link to full report page.
After the battle at Dego on 14-15 April, the Austrians and Piedmontese retired in different directions, the Austrians under General Baron de Beaulieu north-east to Acqui and the Piedmontese under Baron Colli to the west, toward Turin. Bonaparte seeing this, hastily pursued Colli, brought him to battle at Mondovi on 21 April, and defeated him. Colli sued for an armistice, and on 28 April the Piedmontese were put out of the war.
Next Phase: Pursuit to the Po
