
Bonaparte had burst through the Alpine shield and now stood at the western entrance to those "fruitful fields" he later described at St. Helena. His administrative problems were virtually solved; he could requisition supplies at will, and he could concentrate his attention on the problem of defeating a single enemy. However, he was saddled with one additional commitment. Apart from maintaining his army, he was required to refurbish the empty treasury at Paris with the wealth of Italy.
The far-reaching nature of Bonaparte's strategy was clearly evident in the letter he dispatched to the Directory on 28 April;
"I march tomorrow against Beaulieu. I shall force him to recross the Po. I shall cross it immediately afterwards and possess myself all of Lombardy and, within a month, I hope to be in the mountains of the Tyrol, seeking the Army of the Rhine and, in conjunction with it, carry the war into Bavaria."
(Correspondance de Napoleon Ier, I 236-237 (No. 257))
Strategically, in the coming phases of the Italian campaign Bonaparte retains the initiative and keeps the Austrians on the defensive. When he broke through the Maritime Alps he really reversed the the strategical situation. Thereafter, the Austrians were pinned against the barrier of their own Alps, with reestricted lines of communication, while Bonaparte could strike in any of numerous directions.
Bonaparte concluded that the possible crossing points of the Po River were restricted to Valenza, well guarded by Beaulieu, Pavia, above the junction of the Tincio and the Po, and Piacenza, some 70 miles downstream from Valenza. Bonaparte realized that a bridgehead at Pavia would offer only limited opportunities, since Beaulieu could retire on Milan behind successive rivers running at right angles to an eastern advance. On the other hand, an indirect approach, and crossing at Piacenza, would enable him to get behind the Austrians, cut their communications, and menace Milan. This was the plan he then adopted.
Bonaparte's tactics bore a strong resemblence to those of Marlborough when he pierced the famous "ne plus ultra" lines in 1711. Bonaparte first promoted the illusion of an attempted crossing at Valenza. Simultaneously, he organized a special formation of picked troops, totalling 3,600 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, to seize the bridgehead at Piacenza. With the faster marching rate he had inherited with the revolutionary armies, he could reach the selected site before the slower moving Austrians. It appears that Beaulieu became suspicious of Bonaparte's plan; but in a futile effort to cover all contingencies, Beaulieu distributed his forces over a wide front. On the evening of 7 May, by the time Bonaparte's advance guard had seized the crossing at Piacenza, the Austrian troops were dispersed over 50 miles in five detachments, none of which totalled more than 6,000.
The forcing of the Po was a brilliant exploit, but it merely marked a transitional stage in the development of Bonaparte's strategy, which aimed at the destruction of all Austrian power in Italy. However, while he was consolidating his bridgehead at Piacenza, his opponent was withdrawing behind the Adda, another tributary of the Po, and abandoning Milan to its fate. A lesser commander might have been tempted to seize this rich and important centre immediately, but Bonaparte could not be diverted so easily from his aim, and eventually caught up with the Austrian rearguard at Lodi.
The battle of Lodi, on 10 May 1796, is a good illustration of how legend hardens into "history". Tactically, the defeat inflicted on the Austrians was of limited significance, because only their rearguard was involved and after severe fighting it manages to escape and rejoin Beaulieu's main force. Psychologically, however, the battle had great influence on Bonaparte's subsequent career. At a critical point in the fighting he took direct command of the troops, positioned his artillery to give effective support, sent cavalry to find an outflanking ford, and projected his grenadiers across a bridge to dislodge the enemy. He accomplished all this under heavy fire, his personal bravery winning the enthusiasatic admiration of his men, to whom henceforth he was "le petit caporal".
Flattering misinterpretation of his actions at Lodi, unrelated to his tactical skill, established his identity with the common soldier at the same time that it raised him to a higher pedestal of renown. In the end, it would be hard to seperate the image from reality.
Full After Action Report shown below as activated link to full report page.
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