
The encounter on the Pratzen Heights between Morand and Saint-Hilaire's division on the French side and Kollowrath's command on the Allies' side provides a wonderfully interesting illustration, since it is an example of both sides resorting to a rude to gain an advantage over their opponents. Advancing in front of Sainte-Hilaire's force, Morand bumped into Kamenski's brigade. Initially, the 4,000-man Russian force enjoyed the advantage and started to outflank the 10th légère opposed to them. Before the Russians could make headway, however, Morand was joined by Sainte-Hilaire who deployed his men on the right of the 10th légère. A little later further reinforcements arrived in the form of Thiébault's brigade, which was held in columns slightly to the rear. The scales had now turned in favour of the French. However, before the French could repulse Kamenski, the three French generals noticed four regiments advancing in closed order columns on their left rear, apparently having come out of Krenowitz. Morand, Sainte-Hilaire, and Thiébault with the greatest of interest followed the movement of these columns with their filed-glasses. There was nothing, however, that positively identified the approaching force as the enemy.
Presently, an officer rode out of the approaching masses and stopped well within shouting distance. The officer entreated the French not to fire and explained that they were Bavarians. Now, the very night before a Bavarian corps had indeed joined the French army and so the situation was tricky.
According to Thiébault's account, when the three generals conferred he emphatically expressed the opinion that the so-called Bavarians were suspicious and that the French must on no account be caught off guard. They could see neither Bavarian colours nor distinctively Bavarian uniforms. Thus, they agreed to make arrangements as though the 'Bavarians' were the enemy. Thiébault positioned his brigade en crochet (see note below) to Morand's regiment. The two battalions of the 36th de ligne quickly deployed into line and were appuyed on Morand's left. The 2nd battalion of the 14th de ligne remained in column directly behind the left side of the 36th and was to serve as a reserve in case of any unexpected exigencies. Thiébault placed his remaining three guns between the two battalions of the 36th (he had earlier sent three guns to Morand). However, just at this moment Major Fontenay arrived with six 12-pounders. These had been sent by Napoleon who, from his position in the rear, was able to discern that Saint-Hilaire's situation was critical. They were placed on either wing of the 36th. Thiébault took the precaution, however, of masking each of the three demi-batteries with a squad of infantrymen, as did Morand with his guns.
Any uncertainty about the so-called 'Bavarians' was dispelled by what happened next. The officer who had called out was now joined by another who had ridden out from Kamenski's brigade. A short conference ensued, after which the four regiments resumed their advance toward the rear of the French position. Of course, now they were faced by Thiébault's line, Thiébault ordered Major Fontenay to load the guns with both round shot and canister, to be laid for a distance of thirty to forty paces. Fontenay momentarily remonstrated, observing that this would ruin the guns. Thiébault overruled him, saying that this was acceptable as long as the guns were able to fire for ten minutes. When the enemy had approached to the appointed distance, the masking infantry were removed. The surprised enemy found themselves staring down the barrels of nine large caliber guns, which immediately started to wreak havoc. The results are best left to Thiébault's words:
My satisfaction may be imagined when I saw every round tear large square holes through these regiments till they retired a flying mass from the attack on my three battalions. I had not lost a single man, and had I a brigade of cavalry at my disposal not one of my assailants would have escaped.
Thiébault, Paul Charles, Mémoires du general Baron de Thiébault, Vol. II, p. 160-161. Paris 1893-95.
Note: en crochet: This term literally means 'crocheted' and refers to a bent or crooked line. It was usually employed to 'refuse' a flank from an attacking enemy.