Before the end of June 1796, Bonaparte was back with the beseiging force at Mantua, pressing his engineers and artillerymen to accelerate preparations for the reduction of this fortress. Before the very deliberate procedure of a regular seige could be completed, the Austrians had returned in strength to the Tyrol. Bonaparte's new opponent, Field Marshal Count Dagobert-Sigismond de Wurmser had a force available of 47,000 against Bonaparte's army of 42,000. But numbers meant little in the fighting that followed: a demoralized army under uncertain leadership was no match for a revolutionary army inspired by repeated victories.
Wurmser's initial difficulty resembled that of Bonaparte at the beginning of the campaign against the Piedmontese. Wurmser had to penetrate the Tyrol on his southward march before coming to grips with Bonaparte north of the Po. Wurmser solved this problem by splitting his army into two main forces: one, 18,000 men under Quosdanovich, moved down the Chiese Valley west of Lake Garda, aiming for Brescia; the remainder (except for a small detatchment of 5,000 men under Meszaros carrying out a wide flanking manoeuvre in the Brenta Valley), under Wurmser's personal command, descended the Adige Valley, heading for Verona. Although he has been criticized for dividing his forces, it is evident that he could not have brought down his army through the Tyrol on one axis against so alert an opponent. However, Wurmser's immediate objective was to relieve Mantua, and this city became a magnet, irresistibly drawing him to defeat.
The Austrian offensive began on 29 July and for the first time in his career, Bonaparte was to start without the initiative. His uncertainty was shown by the fact that he prepared four seperate plans at the start of the operations. It was obvious that he must defeat the enemy's columns seperately, but which should he first engage? Originally, he contemplated destroying part of Wurmser's force before Quasdanovich could threaten French communications to the west; but on the evening of 29 July Bonaparte decided that he must abandon the line of the Adige and concentrate between that river and the Mincio as a prelude to counter-attacking on the following day. Then, as pressure mounted against his communications at Salo during the night of 29-30 July, Bonaparte decided to reinforce this sector.
Finally, on the afternoon of the 30th, Bonaparte took the unusual step (for him) of calling a council of war at Rovobello. All his generals, except Augereau, advised a retreat; but, characteristically, Bonaparte adopted an agressive plan. Since Quasdanovich, on the western flank, was the chief threat to French communications, Bonaparte decided to raise the seige of Mantua and concentrate against him. Between the end of July and 3 August, Quasdanovich was defeated and driven back at Lonato and Bonaparte was free to turn on Wurmser. Meanwhile the latter had focused his attention on the relief of Mantua, missing an opportunity to strike Bonaparte's rear while he was dealing with Quasdanovich. On 5 August, at Castiglione, five miles south of Lonato, Bonaparte caught Wurmser off balance and won another victory. The Austrians were only saved from complete destruction by a precipitate withdrawl across the Mincio and by the extreme fatigue of the French, who had marched and counter-marched continuously for eight days.
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Throughout the remainder of August 1796, both sides prepared to renew the struggle. The Austrians hoped to stabilize the situation in Germany while Wurmser again attempted to relieve Mantua. Wurmser's second offensive began in early September 1796 and ended in another failure. Having repulsed Moreau's advance east of the Rhine, the Astrians renewed their efforts to relieve Mantua and destroy Bonaparte. Again, Wurmser divided his command, leaving Davidovich to hold the exits from the Tyrol, while the main forcedescended the Brenta Valley in an attempt to get behind the French. Again, Bonaparte's sence of timing and rapid marching enabled him to defeat his enemies in detail.
On 4 September, two days after the main Austrian army began moving down the Brenta, Bonaparte defeated Vukassovich at Rovereto, near the north-eastern end of Lake Garda. The French struck in overwhelming strength, driving the Austrians north of Trento, and dominating the upper end of the Brenta. Thus, in a matter of hours, Bonaparte had turned the tables on Wurmser, the latter's rear communications, not Bonaparte's were in peopardy. The French rapidly pursued the Austrians down the Brenta and destroyed or captured their rearguard at actions at Rovereto and Caliano on the 4th, Lavis on the 5th, Primolano on the 7th, Bassano on the 8th, and La Favotita, just outside Mantua, on the 15th. Wurmser withdrew ignominiously into Mantua, joining the garrison he sought to relieve.
Next Phase: Alvintzi Attacks
